I’m genuinely delighted not just that Trump has appealed Judge Kathleen Williams’ order imposing sanctions for the fraud he conducted in her court, but how he has asked for a stay in her ruling, to which she responded by asking the amici she appointed to weigh in again.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Expedited Motion to Stay the Sanctions Order and Related Proceedings Pending Appeal (DE 114 ) (“Motion”), filed by Plaintiffs President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump Organization, LLC, together with their attorneys Alejandro Brito and Daniel Epstein. In the twenty-four-page Motion, Plaintiffs and their attorneys seek a stay of the Court’s July 13, 2026 Order (DE 106 ) pending appeal and request an expedited ruling from this Court by August 5, 2026. Accordingly, and in light of the fact that Defendants do not intend to appear or file a response to the Motion, the Court requests that the amici curiae previously appointed by the Court on April 29, 2026 (DE 43 )–John Gleeson, David A. O’Neil, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Faith E. Gay, Philippe Z. Selendy, and Corey Stoughton–submit a response identifying relevant legal authority and addressing the multiple issues raised in Plaintiffs’ and their attorneys’ Motion to assist the Court in resolving this matter.
We’re in the Make Attorneys Get Attorneys stage of things, but a single lawyer — DLA Piper’s Chris Oprison — appears to be representing both Trump’s lawyers who were sanctioned, Alejandro Brito and Daniel Epstein, and Trump, his corporate person, and his failsons, replicating one of the problems in the initial suit, the treatment of purportedly different entities as one.
The motion is, in part, a messaging vehicle (of the sort Trump has already been sanctioned for in SDFL). It mentions the word “collusion” (which, based on Xitter traffic, has probably been sent out to propagandists to repeat over and over) 12 times, even though Williams only used it (three times) in her opinion to refer to accusations 35 former government officials made — just twice — in their own intervention. even though Williams spoke of improper purpose and the government officials spoke of fraud.
Settlement became proof of collusion, even though there was none, potential (weak) defenses became proof that the claims were fictitious, which they were not, and ordinary professional relationships became proof of coordination, which did not exist.
[snip]
On May 29, 2026, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to brief their position on certain issues, “including (1) the charges of collusion and whether the Parties are truly adverse; (2) the assertion that the dismissal in this case was premised on deception by the Parties; and (3) the question of whether the case should be reopened because the Court was the ‘victim of a fraud.’”
[snip]
The Sanctions Order’s incorrect findings of collusion, improper purpose, and bad faith all flowed from its threshold legal error on Article III adversity.
[snip]
Moreover, disagreement over an “unprecedented” constitutional question cannot support findings of collusion, improper purpose, and bad faith—much less career-altering sanctions against counsel for advancing the contrary view
[snip]
The Court appointed six amici, devoted nearly thirty pages to the issue, and then wrongly declared the contrary position “so obvious and so insurmountable” that advancing it established collusion, improper purpose, and bad faith.
[snip]
The Sanctions Order’s Purported Indicia of Collusion Do Not Support Its Findings, But Rather Repackage Its Erroneous Theory of Adversity
Every circumstance the Sanctions Order incorrectly invoked as evidence of collusion is consistent with a genuine controversy resolved by settlement.
[snip]
The duration and docket volume of unrelated cases do not establish collusion here.
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Plaintiffs filed on January 29, 2026. The Sanctions Order nevertheless wrongly treated counsel’s appearance at Littlejohn’s October 2023 plea hearing as notice to every Plaintiff of every disclosure, without addressing the later IRS notices. At most, that theory supplied a disputed limitations defense. See Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (The date of discovery applies to “knowledge of each particular disclosure” rather than “by a single generalized event.”); Bancroft Glob. Dev. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 3d 82, 95-97 (D.D.C. 2018) (refusing to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds). This did not establish knowing misconduct or collusion.
The remaining circumstances are further removed from collusion.
[snip]
With respect to Mr. Brito, the Court acknowledged that he “did not sign the ‘settlement agreement,’ but his name appears on it,” which is not evidence to support any erroneous finding of collusion, nor can it rightfully serve to support the Court’s sanctions against Mr. Brito.
[snip]
The May 29 Order directed Plaintiffs to respond to accusations of collusion, adversity, deception, and fraud on the Court. D.E.65 at 2-3. It never ordered Mr. Brito or Mr. Epstein to show cause. It never identified any act by either Attorney as sanctionable. It never advised their professional standing, bar status, or ability to practice in this District was at stake.
The entire motion argues a straw man, collusion, rather than addressing the question at issue, whether there was any adversity between the parties.
It does so in a filing that dodges the primary issue: Whether Donald Trump, with the claims of authority he has made in both the Slaughter case (where he won the right to fire people granted independence by Congress) and an Executive Order signed at the beginning of his term, can claim to be adverse from his own DOJ. The stay request doesn’t mention either of those.
Instead, Oprison (who as Associate White House Counsel helped George W Bush defend against the US Attorney firing scandal) relies heavily on US v Nixon, a case in which there was an Independent Counsel of the sort that Trump — and Aileen Cannon in this District — ruled was unlawful, though he quoted it just once.
The cases that actually govern this dispute confirm adversity. Nixon requires courts to “look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented.” 418 U.S. at 693. For that reason, Nixon found adversity between the President in his personal capacity and an instrumentality of the Executive Branch.
In fact, the part of Nixon that Oprison quotes actually supports Judge Williams, because it describes precisely the kind of analysis she did to find that there was no adversity between Trump and the Executive he has made far more unitary than it was in 1974 (when Nixon was issued) or 2006 (when Oprison argued Bush could fire Senate confirmed US Attorneys).
He views the present dispute as essentially a “jurisdictional” dispute within the Executive Branch which he analogizes to a dispute between two congressional committees. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauber, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), it is contended that a President’s decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel concedes that the President ha delegated certain specific powers to the Special Prosecutor, he has not “waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President’s duty to claim privilege as to all materials . . . which fall within the President’s inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer.” Brief for the President 42. The Special Prosecutor’s demand for the items therefore presents, in the view of the President’s counsel, a political question under Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), since it involves a “textually demonstrable” grant of power under Art. II.
The mere assertion of a claim of an “intra-branch dispute,” without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry. In United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426 (1949), the Court observed, “courts must look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented.” Id. at 337 U. S. 430. [my emphasis]
The motion for a stay mentions Charles Littlejohn — the guy who, under Donald Trump, leaked the tax returns of Trump that all previous Presidents have released willingly — 25 times in the filing. It mentions Alina Habba, whose intervention in Littlejohn’s sentencing triggered the statute of limitations, just twice, and neither time by name, making it impossible, in theory, to distinguish her from the counsels appealing because they — like Habba before them — got sanctioned for their bullshit lawsuit.
In reaching that conclusion, the Sanctions Order wrongly treated the claims of the other plaintiffs—Donald Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump Organization—as “parenthetical” to those of President Trump. Id. at 22 n.29. The Sanctions Order did not separately analyze those Plaintiffs’ injuries, statutory claims, or notice of the disclosures. The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were untimely, incorrectly measuring the limitations period from the appearance of President Trump’s counsel at Littlejohn’s plea hearing, without regard to when each Plaintiff received IRS notice of the disclosures at issue. Id. at 5, 37. The Court relied on judicially noticed news reports, public commentary, and other materials outside the record to find information and make erroneous conclusions about the Parties’ and the Attorneys’ motives.
[snip]
The Sanctions Order’s statute of limitations analysis also fails. D.E.106 at 5, 24 n.31, 37, 43, 50. The Complaint alleged separate discovery dates for each Plaintiff, beginning with President Trump’s January 29, 2024, IRS notice and extending into 2026 for The Trump Organization. D.E.1 ¶¶ 76-86. Plaintiffs filed on January 29, 2026. The Sanctions Order nevertheless wrongly treated counsel’s appearance at Littlejohn’s October 2023 plea hearing as notice to every Plaintiff of every disclosure, without addressing the later IRS notices. At most, that theory supplied a disputed limitations defense. See Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 699 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (The date of discovery applies to “knowledge of each particular disclosure” rather than “by a single generalized event.”); Bancroft Glob. Dev. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 3d 82, 95-97 (D.D.C. 2018) (refusing to dismiss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds). This did not establish knowing misconduct or collusion.
And it’s in that context in which Oprison makes a stupid move in his otherwise best point. In her opinion, Judge Williams dispensed with Trump’s corporate person and his spawn in a footnote, in significant part because then, as now, they are not treating themselves as a party distinct from Trump.
29 Counsel for Plaintiffs points to the other Plaintiffs—Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, and the Trump Organization, LLC—as having separate, disinterested claims from those of President Trump, establishing a viable case or controversy. However, these Plaintiffs share the same attorney, the same parent company, and the same parent and have not espoused any different or distinct view of this matter or this “Settlement.” Accordingly, the Court will treat their role as parenthetical to that of Lead Plaintiff President Trump.
Williams’ logic may be sound, but this was a rather cavalier treatment. Oprison relies heavily on any separate claims the failsons might have to argue there was adversity that never manifested in the IRS lawsuit.
But then he invokes Hunter Biden — the lawsuit Hunter filed because IRS investigators splayed his records all over creation, including on TV, which Littlejohn never did, but which he dropped because he went broke.
Further, the Sanctions Order’s theory is indefensible as to Donald Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and The Trump Organization. None exercised authority over the IRS or Treasury. Yet the Court wrongly treated their claims as “parenthetical” because of shared counsel, family or corporate ties, and a common litigation position with the President. D.E.106 at 22 n.29. That reasoning would disable all Presidents’ family, friends, former colleagues, and affiliated businesses from asserting private rights against the Executive Branch whenever their interests align with the Executive Branch. That is untenable. Article III does not extinguish private statutory rights through association with the President. See, e.g., Biden v. IRS, No. 1:23-cv-02711-TJK (D.D.C. filed Sept. 18, 2023) (suit by Hunter Biden against the IRS, during President Biden’s term, for the alleged unauthorized disclosure of his tax-return information).
And I’m interested in that not just because this is a totally inapt example. Hunter didn’t file with his Daddy, after all. He paid — or rather stiffed, which is the matter of ongoing litigation — his own lawyer in the case. The disgruntled IRS agents didn’t reveal Joe Biden’s tax returns because … they were already public. And Hunter was prosecuted using the kind of protections against unitary government that Trump has completely destroyed.
Hunter Biden never got to avenge the mistreatment of him by the IRS because he went broke. But now Oprison has invited him to tell that story, to explain (as Hunter has been doing non-stop on Xitter of late) how he was never even accused of the kinds of corruption the Trump failsons commit on a daily basis. He certainly never got to lay out how Donald Trump personally intervened in the criminal case against him with both Bill Barr and Jeffrey Rosen, a violation of the same law, 26 CFR 7217, that Williams raised to describe the criminal violations at issue here.
Like all else with this lawsuit and much of what Trump has done lately, I’m not sure Trump is going to like where this could go.
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